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BLETHEN MAINE NEWSPAPERS, INC. V. STATE: 
BALANCING THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW 
AGAINST THE PRIVACY RIGHTS OF VICTIMS OF 
SEXUAL ABUSE 
Kenleigh Nicoletta· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Blethen Maine Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 1 a sharply divided Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, held that release of records relating to 
Attorney General G. Steven Rowe's investigation ofalleged sexual abuse by Catholic 
priests was warranted under Maine's Freedom of Access Act (FOAA). 2 Although such 
investigative records are designated confidential by statute,3 the majority held that the 
public's interest in the contents of the records mandated their disclosure after all 
information identifying persons other than the deceased priests had been redacted. 4 
The concurrence asserted that the majority had reached the correct conclusion, but in 
so doing had unnecessarily expanded the underlying purpose of the FOAA. 5 The two 
dissents both found, however, that release of the records was not warranted in this case, 
both because it compromised the personal privacy interests of the victims, deceased 
priests, and their families, and because there was no public interest falling within the 
purpose of the FOAA compelling disclosure; 6 The dissents also found fault with the 
redaction standard adopted by the majority. 7 
This case required the Law Court to interpret for the first time the personal privacy 
exemption of the FOAA relating to investigative records. In so doing, the Law Court 
was confronted with unique legal, political, and cultural issues relating to crimes of 
sexual abuse in the context of a priest abuse scandal. The Law Court determined that 
the public had a right to view the records, once the identifying information of the 
victims and witnesses named in the reports had been redacted, as a way of under-
standing the Attorney General's response to the numerous reports of sexual abuse by 
Maine priests. The question now becomes: did the Law Court craft a holding that 
* J .D. Candidate, 2007, University of Maine School of Law. The author wishes to thank her family 
for all their love and support. 
I. 2005 ME 56, 871 A.2d 523. 
2. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 401-10 (1989 & Supp. 2005). 
3. ME. REV. ST AT. ANN. tit. I 6, § 614( I )(C)( l 989)("Reports or records that contain intelligence and 
investigative information and that are prepared by, prepared at the direction of or kept in the custody of ... 
the Department of the Attorney General ... are confidential."). 
4. Blethen, 2005 ME 56, ,i 40,871 A.2d at 535. 
5. See id. ,i 41, 871 A.2d at 536 (Saufley, C.J., concurring). 
6. Id. ,i 51, 871 A.2d at 538 (Clifford, J., dissenting); Id. ,i 70, 871 A.2d at 542 (Alexander, J., 
dissenting). 
7. Id. ,i 58, 871 A.2d at 540 (Clifford, J., dissenting); Id. ,i 75, 871 A.2d at 543 (Alexander, J., 
dissenting). 
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would adequately protect the privacy interests of victims and alleged perpetrators of 
crimes while also preserving the public's right to access government records? 
This Note first explains the history of the Maine FOAA as well as the Federal 
Freedom oflnformation Act (FOIA), and the public policies underlying each Act. The 
Note examines the provisions in both the FOAA and the FOIA that exempt investiga-
tive records from disclosure where such disclosure would constitute an invasion of 
personal privacy. Through an analysis of the landmark federal cases interpreting this 
personal privacy exemption, this Note explains the difficult and conflicting interests 
implicated by this exemption, and the divergent views of courts in the application of 
these precedents. This Note shows how the conflicting interests of private individuals 
and the general public came into play in the Blethen decision, and how the Law Court 
balanced these interests in reaching its decision to release the records. After examining 
the conclusions reached by the various opinions in the case, this Note concludes that 
the Law Court reached the right decision in releasing the records and declining to 
adopt a more rigorous test for public interest. However, the court failed to craft a 
redaction standard that would adequately ensure, in future cases, that any personal 
privacy interests of those named in such records would be protected from unwarranted 
public disclosure. 
II. HISTORY OF MAINE'S FOAA AND THE FEDERAL FOIA 
Maine's original freedom of information act was passed in I 959 and was 
commonly known as the Right to Know Act.8 Under this act, access to public records 
in Maine was expansive and included only limited statutory exceptions to disclosure. 9 
However, in 1975, the Right to Know Act was drastically amended; the result was the 
first version of Maine's current Freedom of Access Act (FOAA). 10 The FOAA 
contains a declaration of the public policy behind the act as well as rules of construc-
tion. 11 The first section of the FOAA provides: 
The Legislature finds and declares that public proceedings exist to aid in the conduct 
of the people's business. It is the intent of the Legislature that their actions be taken 
openly and that the records of their actions be open to public inspection and their 
deliberations be conducted openly .... This [Act] shall be liberally construed and 
applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies as contained in the 
declaration of legislative intent. 12 
In addition, the FOAA also provides that "[ e ]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, 
every person has the right to inspect and copy any public record during the regular 
business hours of the agency or official having custody of the public record." 13 These 
sections of the FOAA establish a presumption in favor of disclosure of public records, 
8. P.L. 1959, ch. 219. See Anne C. Lucey, A Section-by-Section Analysis of Maine's Freedom of 
Access Act, 43 ME. L. REV. 169, 169, 170 n.5 (1991). 
9. Lucey, supra note 8, at 169. 
10. P.L. 1975, ch. 758 (codified as amended at ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit. I,§§ 401-410 (1989 & Supp. 
2005). 
11. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. I,§ 401 {1989). 
12. Id. 
13. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. I,§ 408(1) (Supp. 2005). 
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with the burden of establishing that a document fits within an exception to disclosure 
falling upon the agency seeking to withhold the information. The FOAA therefore 
recognizes that a democracy functions best when the general public is informed about 
the actions of its govemment. 14 
However, since its enactment, it has become clear that this right to view govern-
ment records under the FOAA is not absolute. There are more than one hundred 
statutory exceptions to disclosure found within either the FOAA itself or within state 
statutes that designate specific records confidential. 15 In light of the liberal rules of 
construction contained in the first section of the Act, however, Maine courts have 
acknowledged that any exceptions to disclosure must be interpreted narrowly in order 
to further the Act's policy of disclosure. 16 
The first Federal Freedom oflnformation Act (FOIA) was passed on July 4, 1966, 
seven years after Maine's Right to Know Act. 17 Although the FOIA does not contain 
a broad statement oflegislative intent, the legislative history of the Act is replete with 
statements exalting "a broad policy of full disclosure based on American democratic 
theory and a philosophy of open government. "18 Therefore, like the FOAA, the FOIA 
favors disclosure of public records. However, the original 1966 FOIA was extremely 
weak and "might almost have [been] written off as a paper tiger" had it not been 
strengthened by later amendments. 19 
In 1974, in the wake of the Watergate scandal,2° Congress made three substantial 
changes to the FOIA meant to allow citizens greater access to government records. 21 
14. See Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils and 
Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649,652 (1984) (quoting Lydon 8. Johnson, 
Statement by the President upon Signing Bill Revising Public information Provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 895 (July 4, 1966)). 
15. Lucey, supra note 8, at 169. The Maine Freedom of Access Act provides that the term "public 
records," and hence the Act itself, does not apply to any "[ r ]ecords that have been designated confidential 
by statute." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. I, § 402(3)(A) (Supp. 2005). 
16. See Moffett v. Portland, 400 A.2d 340, 348 (Me. 1979) ("[A] corollary to such liberal construction 
of the [FOAA] is necessarily a strict construction of any exceptions to the required public disclosure."). 
See also Guy Gannet Publ'g Co. v. Univ. of Me., 555 A.2d 470,471 (Me. 1989)(citing the Moffett rule); 
Bangor Publ'g Co. v. City of Bangor, 544 A.2d 733, 736 (Me. 1988) (same); Wiggins v. McDevitt, 473 
A.2d 420,423 (Me. 1984) (same). 
17. Freedom oflnformation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 
u.s.c. § 552 (2000)). 
18. Martin E. Halstuk & Charles N. Davis, The Public Interest be Damned: Lower Court Treatment 
of the Reporters Committee "Central Purpose" Reformulation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 983,991 (2002). See 
also Wald, supra note 14, at 652 ("A government by secrecy benefits no one. It injures the people it seeks 
to serve; it damages its own integrity and operation. It breeds distrust, dampens the fervor of its citizens 
and mocks their loyalty." (quoting Edward V. Long, 110 Cong. Rec. 17087 (1964))). 
19. Wald, supra note 14, at 658. 
20. Id. at 659. The Watergate scandal exposed high-level government cover-ups, covert activities and 
numerous invocations by President Nixon of the executive privilege, all resulting in public indignation 
against secrecy in government. Id. As a result, "Watergate created a vacuum into which demands for FOIA 
reform flooded." Id. 
21. See Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 ( I 974) for the text of the post-
Watergate amendments. 
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Most notable was the change to the investigatory record exemption. 22 Whereas the 
earlier version of the FOIA provided that the prohibition against release of 
investigatory records was all but absolute, 23 the 1974 FOIA provided that the 
exemption applied only when certain harmful consequences, such as an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy, would result from disclosure. 24 The amended FOIA 
resulted in a flood of FOIA demands upon government, and the accrual of resultant 
costs, leading Antonin Scalia to call the Act "the Taj Mahal of the Doctrine of 
Unanticipated Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost Benefit Analysis Ignored. "25 
However, although Congress has sought to make government records more accessible 
with these later amendments to the FOIA, the Act is still full of oft-invoked exemptions 
to disclosure. 26 
Both the FOAA and the FOIA were passed with the broad acknowledgement that, 
in a democracy, the public must have the right to examine the activities of its govern-
ment and hold it accountable. 27 However, such broad disclosure of government 
activities was not meant to interfere with the equally fundamental right of private 
citizens to their personal privacy. 28 It is in light of this tension that all FOAA and 
FOIA cases must be decided. 
III. PERSONAL PRIVACY EXEMPTIONS AND THE CENTRAL PURPOSE DOCTRINE 
A. The Personal Privacy Exemptions of the FOAA and FOJA and the 
Reporters Committee Case 
Both the FOAA and the FOIA contain provisions exempting from disclosure 
records held by a law enforcement agency where disclosure might constitute an 
unwa"anted invasion of personal privacy. 29 The Federal Act's personal privacy 
22. Id. Investigatory records are defined in the FOIA as "records or information compiled for law 
enforcement purposes." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2000). 
23. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 55 (1967). This amendment to the 1966 
version of the FOIA specified that the Act did not apply to "investigatory files compiled for law 
enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency." 
24. Id. § 552(b )(7). The two other amendments passed in 1974 imposed mandatory time limits of ten 
to thirty days upon agencies to respond to FOIA requests and authorized courts to review the propriety of 
the classification of documents by government agencies and to review such documents in camera when 
making this determination. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 156 I ( I 974). 
25. Wald, supra note 14, at 664 (quoting Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No 
Clothes, REGULATION, Mar./Apr. 1982, at 14-15). 
26. See, e.g., id at 679 n.124 (discussing the "convoluted history" of Exemption 3, which allows other 
statutes to trump FOIA's policy of disclosure under certain circumstances). 
27. See Federal Freedom of Information Act's bill-signing statement of President Lyndon B. Johnson 
on July 4, 1966, quoted in H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I at I ("[A] democracy works 
best when the people have all the information that the security of the nation permits. No one should be able 
to pull the curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without injury to the public 
interest."). Like the FOIA, Maine's FOAA was "intended to address the public's right to hold the 
government accountable." Blethen Maine Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 2005 ME 56, ,r 31,871 A.2d 523,533 
(citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. I,§ 401 (1989)). 
28. See U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772 (stating 
that the purpose of the FOIA is "not fostered by disclosure of information about private citizens that is 
accumulated in various government files but that reveals little or nothing about an agency's own conduct"). 
29. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 614(!)(C) (1989). 
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exemption provides that the disclosure rules do not apply to "records or information 
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of 
such law enforcement records or information ... (C) could reasonably be expected to 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. "30 The Maine counterpart to 
this exemption is found in the Maine Criminal History Record Information Act 
(Criminal Record Act), which provides, in pertinent part: 
Reports or records that contain intelligence and investigative information and that are 
prepared by, prepared at the direction of or kept in the custody of ... the Department 
of the Attorney General ... are confidential and may not be disseminated if there is 
a reasonable possibility that public release or inspection of the reports or records 
would: ... C. Constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 31 
Exactly what constitutes an unwarranted invasion of privacy lies at the heart of all 
cases addressing the privacy exemptions of both the Maine and Federal Acts. Maine 
courts have acknowledged that where a provision of the FOAA contains the same or 
similar language as a provision in the FOIA, such as the personal privacy exemption, 
Maine courts should use the framework laid down by Federal case law on the subject. 32 
Accordingly, an examination of Federal case law interpreting the personal privacy 
exemption is necessary prior to an examination of the Blethen decision. 
The landmark Supreme Court case addressing the personal privacy exemption of 
the FOIA (Exemption 7(C)) is United States Department of Justice v. Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press. 33 In this case, a CBS news correspondent and 
the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press requested disclosure by the FBI of 
the criminal identification records, 34 commonly known as "rap sheets," of members of 
a notorious organized crime family, the Medicos. 35 The FBI originally denied the 
requests, but then released the rap sheets of the three deceased members of the Medico 
30. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7XC) (2000). 
31. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 614(l)(C) (1989). The privacy exemption of the Criminal History 
Record Information Act is applicable to the FOAA based upon I M.R.S.A. § 402(3)(A), the confidential 
records exemption to disclosure. See supra note 15. 
32. Campbell v. Town of Machias, 661 A.2d 1133, 1136 (Me. 1995) ("Cases arising under the federal 
act are useful in analyzing the scope of Maine's act."). See also Bangor Publ'g Co. v. Town of Bucksport, 
682 A.2d 227, 229-30(Me. 1996); Med. Mut. Ins. Co. ofMe. v. Me. Bureau of Ins., No. CV03-453, 2003 
WL 23 I 85888, at • I (Me. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2003). 
33. 489 U.S. 749 (1989). 
34. Criminal identification records compiled by the FBI include "certain descriptive information, such 
as date of birth and physical characteristics, as well as a history of arrests, charges, convictions, and 
incarcerations of the subject." Id. at 752. The Court further explained that because of the volume of these 
records, they often contain incorrect or incomplete information. Id. 
35. Id. at 7 57. The Medicos operated Medico Industries, an allegedly legitimate Pennsylvania business 
dominated by organized crime figures. Id. The reporters sought disclosure of information concerning the 
Medicos, including their rap sheets, as part of an investigation of allegations of corruption against former 
Pennsylvania Congressman Daniel J. Flood. Halstuk & Davis, supra note 18, at 988. Specifically, the 
journalists believed that Medico Industries obtained a number of defense contracts in exchange for illegal 
political contributions they allegedly gave to Representative Flood. Id. Representative Flood eventually 
resigned from office while under indictment in 1980, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate federal 
campaign laws, and was convicted of conspiracy to solicit campaign contributions from persons seeking 
federal government contracts. Id. 
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family.36 However, the FBI declined to release information pertaining to Charles 
Medico because he was still alive and the Bureau believed that disclosure of his rap 
sheet was not required under the FOIA because it would constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy. 37 
In upholding the FBI's conclusion that dissemination of Medico's rap sheet 
would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, the Court enunciated a 
number of guidelines that continue to be the bedrock of case law interpreting Exemp-
tion 7(C). First, in response to the Reporters Committee's argument that prior public 
disclosure of the information in the records extinguished any privacy right Medico had 
in the information, 38 the Court made a distinction between scattered disclosure of the 
individual bits of information that make up an FBI rap sheet and disclosure of an FBI 
rap sheet as a whole. 39 Although bits of information concerning a private individual's 
criminal history may have, at one time, been public, they usually cease to be "freely 
available" shortly thereafter. 40 The Court therefore concluded that the FOIA was not 
intended to transform government agencies into "clearinghouses" ofinformation about 
private citizens, and to hold that disclosure of government compilations of information 
about private citizens such as rap sheets was warranted in this case would do just that. 41 
Next, the Court articulated a simple, yet enduring, balancing test to determine 
whether disclosure of the records was warranted. 42 The Court found that application 
of Exemption 7(C) required it to "balance the privacy interest in maintaining ... the 
'practical obscurity' of the rap sheets against the public interest in their release. "43 
Only when the public interest in disclosure of such records outweighs the privacy 
interests of individuals would disclosure be warranted. 
In working through this balancing test, the Court laid down three principles that 
have been used by federal courts ever since to evaluate whether disclosure of records 
falling under the Exemption 7 ( C) is warranted. 44 First, "whether disclosure ofa private 
document under Exemption 7(C) is warranted must tum on the nature of the requested 
document and its relationship to the basic purpose of the Freedom oflnformation Act 
'to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny. "'45 Second, the Court explained: 
[W]hen the subject of a [record] is a private citizen and when the information is in the 
Government's control as a compilation, rather than as a record of 'what the 
36. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 757. 
37. See Halstuk & Davis, supra note 18, at 988 (citing Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 757). 
38. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762-63. 
39. Id. at 764. 
40. Id. 
41. See id. 
42. Id. at 762. 
43. Id. The term "practical obscurity" refers to the Court's view that despite the fact that the individual 
pieces of information that make up a rap sheet may all be available to the public, the process of tracking 
all such information down and compiling it often would have been extremely difficult. See id. at 764. 
44. Id. at 772-80. See Christopher P. Beall, The Exaltation of Privacy Doctrines Over Public 
Information Law, 45 DUKE L.J. 1249, 1255 (1996); Fred H. Cate et al., The Right to Privacy and the 
Public's Right to Know: The "Central Purpose" of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L REV. 
41, 44-45 (1994); Halstuk & Davis, supra note 18, at 987. 
45. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 772 (quoting Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352,372 (1976)). 
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Government is up to,' the privacy interest protected by Exemption 7(C) is in fact at 
its apex while the FOIA-based public interest in disclosure is at its nadir. 46 
Finally, the Court held that, "as a categorical matter," when a request does not seek 
information about the actions of a government agency but only records that the 
government happens to be storing that pertain to private individuals, the invasion of 
privacy is unwarranted. 47 Thus, in Reporters Committee, because the journalists were 
not seeking information pertaining to government action, but only information about 
a private citizen, release ofMedico 's rap sheet would clearly constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of privacy. 48 
B. The Central Purpose Doctrine 
The three principles established in Reporters Committee addressing when dis-
closure is warranted gave rise to what is now known as the "central purpose 
doctrine. "49 This doctrine has become a "unifying ideology" for courts in interpreting 
the FOIA and has come to stand for the proposition that the FOIA is meant to protect 
citizens' rights to know "what their government is up to," in order to find out whether 
their government is acting according to their wishes. 50 However, according to 
Reporters Committee, the Act was not meant to include the right of a citizen to gain 
access to information about private individuals that just happens to be in government 
files. 51 In other words, the Act should be viewed as a means to an end, but not an end 
itself. 52 Although some scholars argue for a broader applicability, 53 the central purpose 
doctrine has only been applied in cases addressing the two personal privacy exemp-
tions of the FOIA: Exemption 7(C) and Exemption 6, which provides an exemption 
from disclosure for "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of 
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. "54 
46. Id. at 780. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. For a detailed discussion of how the Reporters Committee case gave rise to the "central purpose 
doctrine" and its resultant effects, see Beall, supra note 44. Beall explains that although the Court in 
Reporters Committee never specifically identified the doctrine by this name, it did intend that the three 
principles outlined in the opinion were meant to be "a way of interpreting the asserted congressional 
intentions underlying the FOIA." Id. at 1255. 
50. Id. at 1255, 1258. 
51. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 765. 
52. Beall, supra note 44, at 1258. 
53. Compare Cate et al., supra note 44, at 45-46 (arguing that the central purpose analysis should be 
extended to all records held by the government and thus only those records that would serve the central 
purpose of the FOIA should ever be subject to disclosure under the act), with Beall, supra note 44, at 1262 
(arguing that expanding the central purpose doctrine to areas outside of the privacy exemptions "would 
work a dramatic volte face from the principles ofFOIA, improperly shifting the Act from one that favors 
disclosure to one that favors secrecy"), and Halstuk & Davis, supra note 18, at I 024 (indicating that use 
by lower courts of the central purpose doctrine in contexts other than the privacy exemptions circumvents 
the legislative intent of presumptive openness that is the basic principle of the FOIA and "substitutes 
judicial prerogative for legislative fact-finding"). 
54. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000). Subsequent to Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court has noted 
that the only substantive difference in analysis between Exemption 7(C) and Exemption 6 is that Exemption 
6 places a higher burden upon the government in denying disclosure. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray, 
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The central purpose doctrine effected a drastic change in the way courts inter-
preted the FOIA, especially with respect to the personal privacy exemptions. 55 
Although the FOIA had previously been regarded as a statute that established a 
presumption in favor of disclosure of government records, the central purpose doctrine 
served to reverse the burden of proof in those cases falling under Exemptions 6 and 
7(C) of the FOIA, putting it upon the party seeking disclosure of such records. 
C. Cases Applying the Central Purpose Doctrine 
Subsequent to Reporters Committee, the United States Supreme Court has had 
three opportunities to revisit, and reaffirm, the applicability of the central purpose 
doctrine to cases falling under the FOIA's personal privacy exemptions. 56 In United 
States Department of State v. Ray, respondents, who were Haitian nationals, sought the 
release of reports of interviews conducted by State Department personnel with other 
Haitians who had been involuntarily returned to Haiti by the United States. 57 The 
reports were released with the names of interviewees and identifying information 
redacted. 58 In reversing the lower court's decision that it was improper for the State 
Department to have redacted identifying information ofinterviewees in the documents 
they released, the Supreme Court stated that the FOIA explicitly authorized redaction 
in such situations where identifying information would not serve to further inform 
citizens about the operation of government. 59 Thus, redaction was one way that the 
legislature sought to enable government to "balance the public's right to know with the 
private citizen's right to be secure in his personal affairs which have no bearing or 
effect on the general public." 60 
Respondents argued that release of the identifying information of individual 
interviewees would allow them to pursue additional information that might shed light 
on government action; thus, the identifying information could be used derivatively to 
inform citizens about the government's performance. 61 This, argued respondents, 
502 U.S. 164, 172 (1991). Under Exemption 6, the government must establish that disclosure "would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," while under Exemption 7(C), the 
government must only establish that release "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6),(7)(C) (2000) (emphasis added). 
55. See, e.g., Halstuk & Davis, supra note 18, at 995-96 ("[The] 'central purpose' test represents an 
alarming instance of judicial activism, with the Supreme Court having rewritten legislation in order to 
constrict the ambit of the FOIA's statutory purpose ... critically impairing the ability of requesters to 
receive government information."); Beall, supra note 44, at 1279-80 ("The essential operation of the central 
purpose doctrine reestablishes a presumption in favor of nondisclosure, contrary to the original spirit of 
FOIA."). 
56. U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164 (1991); U.S. Dep't of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 
510 U.S. 487 (1993); Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004). Although both 
Ray and Federal Labor Relations deal with Exemption 6 of the FOIA, the Court has made it clear that the 
central purpose doctrine is equally applicable to both Exemption 7(C) and Exemption 6. See Cate et al., 
supra note 44, at 44-45. 
57. Ray, 502 U.S. at 168. 
58. Id. at 169. 
59. Id. at 174 (citing the discussion of redaction in Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom 
of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755 n.7 (1989)). 
60. Id. at 174 n.10 (quoting S. Rep. No. 89-813 at 7 (1965)). 
61. Id. at 178. In his concurrence in Ray, Justice Scalia found fault with the majority's decision not 
to explicitly reject respondent's derivative use theory in Ray, and also with its use of a derivative theory in 
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would increase the public interest in release of the information and bring it more 
squarely within the central purpose of the FOIA, a contention the Court found 
unsupportable in this case. 62 Although the Court did not find such an argument 
compelling in this case, it did not adopt a rigid rule against such a "derivative use" 
theory to justify the release of the identifying information in such documents. 63 
Similarly, in United States Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations 
Authority, 64 the Supreme Court upheld redaction of employees' home addresses in 
reports released by federal employment agencies. 65 In this case, two unions sought the 
names and addresses of Army, Navy, and Air Force employees in order to contact them 
as potential union members. 66 According to the Court, release of the addresses would 
serve only to "allow the unions to communicate more effectively with employees," but 
would not provide the unions with information about the actions or performance of the 
government agency. 67 Thus, because the unions' request did not advance the central 
purpose of the FOIA, the employees' privacy interests in their personal information 
clearly outweighed the public interest in disclosure of the documents. 68 
The Supreme Court's most recent decision involving the central purpose doctrine 
came in National Archives and Records Administration v. Favish, 69 where the Court 
for the first time addressed whether the personal privacy interest under Exemption 7 ( C) 
extended to a decedent's family members who objected to release of photographs 
showing the decedent's body. 70 In Favish, an attorney for Accuracy in Media, Allan 
F avish, sought release of photographs showing the corpse ofVincent Foster, Jr., deputy 
counsel to President Clinton, at the scene of his death. 71 Favish was skeptical of the 
finding by five different government agencies (including the United States Park Police 
and the FBI) that Foster had committed suicide. 72 The Court first sought to determine, 
in accordance with Reporters Committee, whether there was even a personal privacy 
evaluating the personal privacy interest at stake in the case. Id. at 180-81 (Scalia, J., concurring). In so 
finding, Justice Scalia stated that "it is unavoidable that the focus, in assessing a claim under Exemption 
6, must be solely upon what the requested information reveals, not upon what it might lead to." Id. at 180. 
Thus, according to Justice Scalia, the majority erred when it failed to reject the derivative use theory on the 
public-benefits side, but then considered the derivative effects disclosure of identifying information might 
have on the personal-privacy side. Id. at 181. These derivative effects included the risk that interviewees 
might face retaliation by the Haitian government ifidentified, or that their personal privacy may be invaded 
by further unauthorized requests for interviews. Id. at 176-77. For further discussion of the "derivative 
use" theory in Exemptions 6 and 7(C) cases and its use or rejection in district court cases, see Beall, supra 
note 44, at 1264-84. 
62. Id. at 178. 
63. Id. at 178-79. 
64. 510 U.S. 487 (1993). 
65. Id. at 503. 
66. Id. at 490 & nn.1-2. 
67. Id. at 497. 
68. See id. at 497-98. 
69. 541 U.S. 157 (2004). Favish was decided prior to the Law Court's decision in Blethen, but 
subsequent to the filingofbriefs by the parties. Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 2005 ME 56, 1147, 
871 A.2d 523, 537 (Saufley, C.J., concurring). Therefore, the parties did not present arguments addressing 
the applicability of Favish to the issues in Blethen. Id. 
70. Favish, 541 U.S. at 160. 
71. Id. at 160-61. 
72. Id at 161. 
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interest at stake in the case. 73 The Court acknowledged that Foster's family was not 
seeking to assert the personal privacy right on Foster's behalf; instead, Foster's 
relatives claimed that the personal privacy Exemption in 7(C) secured their own right 
to be shielded "from a sensation-seeking culture for their own peace of mind and 
tranquility." 74 The Court agreed with the family's interpretation of"personal privacy," 
stating that "[f]amily members have a personal stake in honoring and mourning their 
dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by intruding upon their 
own grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the deceased 
person who was once their own. "75 
After finding a personal privacy interest cognizable under Exemption 7(C), the 
Court proceeded to determine whether Favish's request implicated any significant 
public interest in disclosure under the FOIA.76 The Court concluded that it did not. 77 
In making this determination, the Court clarified what was required of a requestor in 
seeking to establish the existence of a public interest cognizable under the FOIA: first, 
the requestor must show that the public interest to be advanced was more specific and 
important than just general public interest or curiosity in a matter, and second, the 
requestor must show that the information is likely to advance that interest. 78 The Court 
declined to list the reasons that would suffice to meet the first standard, but did state 
that where the facts were similar to those of Pavish, ''the justification most likely to 
satisfy Exemption 7(C)'s public interest requirement is that the information is 
necessary to show the investigative agency . . . acted negligently or otherwise 
improperly in the performance of their duties." 79 The Court then held that where this 
was the justification for release of information, the requestor would need to "produce 
evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged 
Government impropriety might have occurred." 80 To hold otherwise would render 
Exemption 7(C) "nothing more than a rule ofpleading." 81 
Pavish therefore clarified two issues pertaining to Exemption 7(C) that had 
previously been unclear from or unaddressed by earlier cases. First, it established that 
family members of deceased individuals named in government records could assert a 
privacy interest under Exemption 7(C).82 Second, it explicitly outlined what was 
73. Id. at 164. 
74. Id. at 166. 
75. Id. at 168. 
76. Id. at 172. 
77. Id. at 175. 
78. Id. at 172. The Court explained that usually, when information is requested by citizens pursuant 
to the FOIA, they need not articulate a reason for disclosure. Id. However, when information falls within 
an exemption such as 7(C), the presumption switches to that ofnondisclosure, with the burden now falling 
upon the requestor to establish a sufficient reason for disclosure. Id. 
79. Id. at 172-73. The Court never specifically mentions the central purpose doctrine in its opinion, 
but this statement reaffirms that doctrine's applicability. Specifically, where a citizen requests disclosure 
of information by the government under the FOIA, that information should serve the central purpose of the 
FOIA as articulated in Reporters Committee: it should shed light on government activity and should not 
simply reveal information about private citizens held by government agencies. See supra Part III.B. 
80. Id. at 174 (citing U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 178-79 (1991); United States v. 
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,464 (1996); United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. I, 14-15 (1926)). 
81. Id. at 174. 
82. Id. at 170. 
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required of a requestor seeking disclosure ofrecords falling under Exemption 7(C): a 
complaint containing clear evidence that the records requested would directly reveal 
government conduct of interest to the public for more than just mere curiosity's sake. 83 
Only after the requestor had made this affirmative showing would application of the 
balancing test established in the Reporters Committee case be triggered. 84 However, 
a number of issues were left unclear by Favish as well. First, the Court was not 
required to address what steps short of complete nondisclosure of the records, such as 
redaction, would be sufficient to protect the privacy interests of family members of 
deceased individuals. 85 Further, the Court declined to address whether anything short 
of an allegation of government misconduct would suffice as a public interest 
warranting disclosure under Exemption 7(C). 86 Finally, the Court did not consider the 
likelihood that future requestors would be able to successfully clear the evidentiary 
hurdle established by the Court in Favish, especially in cases where the only clear 
evidence of government misconduct was the requested documents themselves. 87 
In addition to this line of Supreme Court decisions, numerous federal district 
courts have, in the years since Reporters Committee, applied and expounded on the 
principles outlined in that case. 88 For the most part, district courts have interpreted and 
applied the central purpose doctrine as a tool for preventing disclosure, requiring 
evidence that release of the documents will directly reveal government misconduct in 
order to find that release is warranted.89 However, a limited few have found that the 
central purpose doctrine can be used to compel disclosure. 90 In so doing, these courts 
have argued that release of certain records containing information about private 
citizens may nevertheless allow individuals to determine whether government has acted 
properly, thus endorsing the derivative use theory discussed in Ray. 91 In other words, 
83. Id. at 174-75. 
84. Id. 
85. The Court did not address this issue because it found that Favish had not proffered any credible 
evidence of government misconduct, and therefore held the records to be exempt from disclosure solely for 
this reason. Id. at 175. 
86. Id. at 172-73. 
87. Id. The only guidance the Court gave on this point was its statement that "[a]llegations of 
government misconduct are 'easy to allege and hard to disprove,' so courts must insist on a meaningful 
evidentiary showing." Id. (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,585 (1998)). 
88. See Halstuk & Davis, supra note I 8, at 996 n. 76 ( collecting cases); see, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers 
Int'!Ass'n, Local 19 v. U.S. Dep'tofVeteranAffairs, 135 F.3d 891 (3dCir. 1998); Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep't 
of Justice, 139 F.3d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1998); McQueen v. United States, 179 F.R.D. 522 (S.D. Tex. 1998); 
Ligomer v. Reno, 2 F. Supp. 2d 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Ctr. to Prevent Handgun Violence v. U.S. Dep't of 
the Treasury, 981 F. Supp. 20 (D.D.C. Cir. 1997); Sheet Metal Workers Int'! Ass'n, Local 9 v. U.S. Air 
Force, 63 F.3d 994 (10th Cir. 1995); Manna v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 5 I F.3d 1158 (3d Cir. 1994); Exner 
v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 902 F. Supp. 240 (D.D.C. 1995); Jones v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238 (6th Cir. 1994); U.S. 
Dep't of the Navy v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 975 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1992); Hunt v. FBI, 972 F.2d 286 
(9th Cir. 1992); Hale v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 973 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1992). 
89. Beall, supra note 44, at 1280. 
90. Id. 
91. Id.; see Rosenfeld v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 57 F.3d 803,812 (9th Cir. 1995)(holding that release 
of FBI investigation records without redacting names of investigation subjects might make it possible to 
determine whether FBI acted improperly); Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 98 
(6th Cir. 1996) (arguing that release ofa mug shot "can more clearly reveal the government's glaring error 
in detaining the wrong person for an offense" than can a written record and thus finding that the requested 
mug shots should be released). 
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this minority of courts has not found that the information itself must be sought to reveal 
government misconduct, but rather that the records might contain information that 
could lead to such a conclusion. Such a view has found little favor in most courts. 
Despite this extensive case law under the FOIA, prior to the Blethen case, courts 
in Maine had yet to address whether the central purpose doctrine was applicable to 
cases falling under the FOAA's own personal privacy exemption. Only in limited 
circumstances had Maine even addressed, albeit indirectly, whether personal privacy 
interests could ever trump the FOAA's policy favoring disclosure. 92 
IV. THE BLETHEN DECISION 
In Blethen Maine Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 93 Blethen, the publisher of several 
Maine newspapers, sought judicial review of the decision by the state Attorney 
General, G. Steven Rowe, not to release records pertaining to his investigation of 
alleged sexual abuse by eighteen deceased priests. 94 In June 2002, Blethen filed a 
request, pursuant to the FOAA to view these records. 95 The Attorney General denied 
the request, concluding that the records were designated confidential under the Maine 
Criminal History Record Information Act (Criminal Record Act) because they would 
both "[i]nterfere with law enforcement proceedings" and"[ c ]onstitute an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy." 96 Therefore, the Attorney General concluded that the 
records Blethen sought were exempt from disclosure under the FOAA. 97 
Blethen subsequently appealed to the Maine Superior Court (Kennebec County, 
Studstrup, J.), 98 which agreed with the Attorney General's argument that "release of 
these documents would interfere with law enforcement" because the Attorney 
General's office had only had the documents for a short period of time and investiga-
tion into the records was ongoing. 99 However, the court declined to address the 
Attorney General's second contention under the Criminal Record Act that the records 
constituted an "unwarranted invasion of privacy." 100 The Superior Court retained 
jurisdiction of the matter and entered an order providing for reexamination of the status 
92. See Guy Gannett Publ'g Co. v. Univ. of Me., 555 A.2d 470,471 (Me. 1989)(addressing ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 7070(2)(A)(2002), a statute designating confidential medical files of public employees, 
thus exempting such information from disclosure under the FOAA). 
93. 2005 ME 56, 871 A.2d 523. 
94. Id. ,r 2, 871 A.2d at 525. The records at issue in this case were handed over to Attorney General 
Rowe in May 2002 by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Portland. Kevin Wack, Paper Prevails in Lawsuit 
Over Priests' Names, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Apr. 23, 2005, at Al. The Diocese had been collecting 
allegations of abuse against priests and other clergy members for seventy-five years, but in most cases had 
never reported these allegations to the Attorney General. Gregory D. Kesich, Court Questions Ruling on 
Abuse Records, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, May 14, 2004, at 18. 
95. Blethen, 2005 ME 56, 1) 3,871 A.2d at 525. 
96. Id. ,r 5,871 A.2d at 526 (applying ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 16, § 614(A), (C) (2006)). See supra 
text accompanying note 31. 
97. Id. 
98. Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. State, No. AP-02-43, 2002 WL 31360637, at *I (Me. Super. Ct. 
Sept. 11, 2002). 
99. Id. at *I. Although it appeared from the records that all the priests named were deceased, and thus 
could not be prosecuted, the Attorney General explained that information in the records could possibly lead 
to viable prosecutions or influence an ongoing investigation. Id. 
100. Id. 
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of the documents for law enforcement purposes six months from the date of the order 
to determine whether the investigation was still ongoing. 101 Although the Superior 
Court declined to decide whether release of the documents would constitute an unw-
arranted invasion of privacy, the court did note that a decision on that point was 
inevitable. 102 The court acknowledged that the decision would rest on a balancing test 
which would weigh the privacy interests of the victims and perpetrators against the 
public's right to be informed. 103 The court also acknowledged that the question of 
whose privacy interests were at stake was a complicated one, as case law was not 
entirely clear on whether privacy rights are extinguished upon death. 104 
Subsequently, the Attorney General reported to the Superior Court that disclosure 
of the records would no longer negatively affect the investigations. 105 Thus, the parties 
turned their attention to the personal privacy exemption issue that the court had not 
reached in its earlier decision: whether release of the records would constitute an 
"unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" under the Criminal Record Act. 106 After 
a nontestimonial hearing, the Superior Court concluded that the records should be fully 
disclosed. 107 The State appealed to the Maine Law Court, which affirmed the lower 
court's judgment to the extent that it ordered disclosure of the records, but vacated the 
lower court's decision not to redact the names and identifying information of the 
witnesses and victims contained in the records. 108 The court expressly held, however, 
that the names of the deceased priests were not to be redacted. 109 
On appeal, the State argued that there was clearly "a 'reasonable possibility' that 
disclosure of [the records] would result 'in an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy' of both the victims, their families and other witnesses" 110 and the alleged 
perpetrators. 111 The State asserted that the applicable federal case law on the subject 
of the FOIA's personal privacy exemption established that persons involved in investi-
gations have a substantial privacy interest in their involvement remaining confidential, 
"even if they are not the subject of the investigation." 112 Further, the State argued that 
where an investigation does not result in a public prosecution, the targets of that 
investigation retain a privacy interest in the records remaining confidential, which 
interest can extend after death. 113 
The State also argued that the privacy interest encompassed by the Criminal 
Record Act extends to close family members of deceased individuals whose names 
IOI. Id. at *2. 
102. Id. at *I. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 2005 ME 56, ,i 7, 871 A.2d 523,527. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. ,i 40,871 A.2d at 535. 
108. Id. ,i 2, 698 A.2d at 535. 
109. Id. 
I 10. Briefof Appellants at5-6, Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 2005 ME 56,871 A2d 523 (No. 
KEN-03-697). 
11 I. Id. at 12. 
112. Id. at 8 (quoting Davis v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). 
I 13. Id. at 13-14 (citing Campbell v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 164 F.2d 20, 33-34 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). 
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appear in government files. 114 Therefore, the State argued that the release of the 
reports containing the identities of the deceased priests accused of child sexual abuse 
would be an unwarranted invasion of both the deceased priests' and their family 
members' personal privacy rights.115 
The State finally argued that the court below had erred in its application of the 
FOAA balancing test as articulated in the Reporters Committee case, in that it 
misconstrued the public policy goals behind the FOAA. 116 The State contended that 
the lower court was misguided in its belief that the Catholic Church and the general 
public had an interest in learning how the Diocese dealt with the allegations of child 
sexual abuse and how to prevent similar incidents in the future, and that such interests 
substantially outweighed any privacy right of named individuals. 117 Instead, the State 
maintained that the public policy behind Maine's FOAA, like the federal FOIA, 
focused "on the citizens' right to be informed with 'what their government is up to,"' 
and that such a policy was not furthered by "disclosure of information about private 
citizens that has accumulated in various governmental files but reveals nothing about 
an agency's own conduct." 118 Because Blethen was not claiming any misconduct or 
mismanagement on the part of law enforcement officials or the Attorney General's 
office, the public policy concern was not as strong as the lower court had found, and 
was thus unable to outweigh the personal privacy concerns of the victims, witnesses, 
alleged perpetrators, and their families. 119 
Blethen, on appeal, argued that based upon the FOAA's underlying public policy 
and liberal rules of construction, 120 exceptions to disclosure are to be interpreted 
narrowly. 121 Thus, interpretation of"personal privacy" by the Court required a narrow 
reading falling within traditional notions of the concept. 122 Blethen contended that 
under Maine law, personal privacy had been interpreted according to the standard for 
the invasion of that right as outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which 
provides that "an action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by a living 
individual whose privacy is invaded," and not "by other persons such as members of 
the individual's family." 123 Blethen maintained that the Legislature could not have 
intended to expand the common law meaning of personal privacy when it used that 
term in the Criminal Record Act. Thus, Blethen argued that a deceased person has no 
114. Id. at 14. (citing Favish v. Office oflndep. Counsel, 217 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd 
sub nom. Nat') Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 1057 (2004)) ("[T]he personal privacy in 
the statutory exemption extends to the memory of the deceased held by those tied closely to the deceased 
by blood or love."). 
115. Id. at 15. 
I 16. Id. at 15-16. For an explanation of the Reporters Committee balancing test, see supra text 
accompanying notes 42-48. 
117. Id. at 15. 
118. Id. at 16(quoting U.S. Dep'tofJusticev. Reporters Comm. forFreedomofthe Press,489 U.S. 749, 
773 (1989)). 
119. Id. at 17. 
120. Brief of Appellee at 6, Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 2005 ME 56, 871 A.2d 523 (No. 
KEN-03-697). See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. 
121. Id. at 7-8 (citing Doe v. Dep't of Mental Health, 1997 ME 195, ,i 12,699 A.2d 422, and Guy 
Gannett Publ'g Co. v. Univ. of Maine, 55 A.2d 470,471 (Me. 1989)). 
122. Id. at 8. 
123. Id. at 9 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 6251 cmt. a (1977)). 
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right to personal privacy, nor can such an invasion be claimed on his behalf by family 
members. 124 Blethen also cited authority from other jurisdictions similarly holding that 
one's personal privacy interest is eliminated or at least greatly diminished by death. 125 
Blethen argued that, in light of the extinguished or greatly reduced interest that a 
deceased person has in his personal privacy rights, as well as the long-standing concept 
that that right could not be asserted by family members, any such personal privacy 
interest was greatly outweighed by the overwhelming interests in public disclosure. 126 
In contrast to the State's argument that there was no compelling public interest within 
the meaning of the FO AA, Blethen contended thatthe pub lie' s "interest in knowing the 
extent to which information regarding alleged abusers was disclosed to the State, the 
nature of the State's knowledge, the State's investigation, and the record on which the 
State based the conclusions reached in its Report" far outweighed any existing privacy 
interest. 127 Blethen did not specifically allege that it sought information that might 
reveal government misconduct; however, this failure was most likely due to the fact 
that Favish was decided subsequent to the filing of briefs by the parties in Blethen. 128 
Instead, Blethen contended that a "public accounting" of the abuse scandal, including 
a release of the names of those accused and what was done about the accusations, 
would provide victims with some amount of vindication and closure and could 
encourage other victims to come forward. 129 Thus, Blethen concluded that because of 
these compelling public interests, the lower court correctly applied the FOAA 
balancing test. Blethen argued in the alternative that, should the Law Court find that 
any of the information contained in the records was exempt from disclosure under the 
personal privacy exemption of the Criminal Record Act, that information should be 
appropriately redacted allowing the remainder to be disclosed to the public. 130 
The majority in the Blethen decision considered three factors in reaching its 
decision: "(I) the personal privacy interests of the alleged victims, witnesses, and 
deceased priests in maintaining the confidentiality of the records sought by Blethen; 
(2) the public interest supporting disclosure of the records; and (3) the balancing of the 
private and public interests." 131 Citing Reporters Committee, 132 and U.S. Department 
of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 133 the court found that the personal 
privacy concerns of the Criminal Record Act included an individual's interest in 
avoiding public disclosure of personal matters as well as an interest in controlling how 
124. Id. at 9-11. 
125. Id. at 11-12 (citing Swickard v. Wayne County Med. Exam'r, 475 N.W.2d 304,313 (Mich. 1991); 
Diamond v. FBI, 707 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir. 1975); McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1257 (3d Cir. 
1993); Ferguson v. FBI, 774 F. Supp. 815,825 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Rabbitt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 383 F. 
Supp. 1065, 1070 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Kyle v. United States, No. Civ-80-1038E, 1987 WL 13874(W.D.N.Y. 
July 16, I 987)). 
126. Id. at 14. 
127. Id. at 15. 
128. See Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 2005 ME 56, ,I 47,871 A.2d 523,537 (Saufley, C.J., 
concurring). 
129. Brief of Appellee, supra note 120, at 16-17. 
130. Id. at 25. 
131. Blethen, 2005 ME 56, ,i 14,871 A.2d at 529. 
132. 489 U.S. 749 (1989). 
133. 510 U.S. 487 (1994). 
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personal information is disseminated to the public. 134 In considering the privacy 
interests of the living persons (victims and witnesses) contained in the records, the 
court reasoned that although many names had already been disclosed and none of the 
information was obtained under the protection of the confessional or in another manner 
that would lead the disseminator to have an expectation of complete confidentiality, 
all personal privacy interests had not been extinguished. 135 The court further 
acknowledged that where private individuals are named in a criminal investigation 
report, "the privacy interest protected by the privacy exception is at its apex." 136 
As for the privacy interests of the deceased priests and their family members, the 
court acknowledged that it had "not previously considered whether the privacy 
interests protected by the Criminal History Record Information Act continue after a 
person's death." 137 The court noted, however, that the two federal circuit courts of 
appeal that had considered the question had reached conflicting conclusions. 138 The 
court then acknowledged that F avish had very recently settled the dispute between the 
circuits by establishing that family members could assert their own privacy interests 
in information about deceased relatives. 139 In evaluating the continuing privacy 
interests of both the deceased priests and their living family members, the court 
concluded that "[ o ]ur in camera inspection of the records reveals that the passage of 
time has substantially dissipated or extinguished the privacy interests of the deceased 
priests, if any, and of their relatives." 14° Concluding that because the length of time 
from both the alleged misconduct and the deaths of the priests was measured in 
decades, "any residual privacy interests of the deceased priests and their immediate 
family members in this case are, at most, minimal." 141 The court further emphasized 
that the unique cultural interests implicated by grieving family members, which was 
central to the holding in Favish, was not present here, and thus the court was not bound 
to find that the priests' family members retained a strong privacy interest in the records 
remaining confidential so many years after the deaths of the priests. 142 
In examining the public interest in disclosure of the records, the court used the 
central purpose doctrine developed in Reporters Committee. 143 Under the central 
purpose doctrine, and mindful of the liberal construction to be given the FOAA, the 
court found that the public's interest in understanding the Attorney General's decision 
not to bring criminal charges during his investigation of child sexual abuse by priests 
was encompassed by the "central purpose" of the FOAA. 144 In so doing, the court 
134. Blethen, 2005 ME 56, ,r 15,871 A.2d at 529. 
135. Id. ,r,I 19-21, 871 A.2d at 530. 
136. Id. ,r 15,871 A.2d at 529. 
137. Id. ,r 23,871 A.2d at 531. 
138. Id. (Comparing Campbell v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 33 (D.C. Cir. I 998)(concluding 
that deceased persons do have residual reputation and family-related privacy interests) with McDonnell v. 
United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1261 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that deceased persons have "no privacy 
interest subject to invasion by disclosure")). 
139. Blethen, 2005 ME 56, ,r 23, 871 A.2d at 531. 
140. Id. ,r 24, 871 A.2d at 531. 
141. Id. ,r,I 24, 25, 871 A.2d at 531-32. 
142. Id. ,r 31, 871 A.2d at 533. 
143. Id. ,r 28, 871 A.2d at 532. 
144. Id. ,r 32, 871 A.2d at 533. 
HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 252 2007
252 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1 
expressly declined to find that the holding in Favish was applicable to the facts of this 
case, stating that "[t]here is ... no basis in the text of the FOAA or the public policy 
it implements to cause us to engraft Favish 's requirement of evidentiary proof of 
governmental impropriety to justify the public disclosure of photographic images of 
a corpse onto a request for written investigative files." 145 Further, the court emphasized 
that the FOAA was to "be liberally construed and applied" to promote its underlying 
policy of providing the public with information about what its government is up to, and 
"[a]bsent the unique cultural and familial interests confronted in Favish, the public's 
interest in knowing what its government is up to encompasses a broader universe of 
concerns than simply the possibility of governmental wrongdoing." 146 The court 
therefore concluded that Blethen's request would further a substantial public interest, 
falling within the central purpose of the FOAA, and thus would warrant any resultant 
invasion of personal privacy. 147 
The final step taken by the court was to balance the private and public interests it 
had found in the case. 148 The court found that the privacy interests of the deceased 
priests and their families were minimal at most, but that the other individuals named 
in the reports retained a substantial privacy interest in nondisclosure. 149 In an effort to 
protect this interest, the court determined that all the identifying information of the 
other private individuals could be effectively redacted from the records, thus greatly 
reducing these individuals' privacy interests. 150 The court concluded that once this 
redaction had been accomplished, the substantial public interest in disclosure would 
outweigh any remaining personal privacy interests. 151 
Chief Justice Saufley concurred, agreeing with the result reached by the court in 
the majority opinion, but specifically disagreeing with the majority's refusal to apply 
the evidentiary requirements crafted by the Supreme Court in F avish. 152 Instead, under 
Chief Justice Saufley's assessment, Favish had set out the correct standard for the 
treatment of requests for investigatory records under both the FOIA and the FOAA: 
there should be a "prohibition on their release unless there are allegations and evidence 
of government misconduct that warrant disclosure of the information." 153 In failing to 
apply Favish, the concurrence argued that the court had improperly minimized the 
historic distinction between general public records and criminal investigation 
records. 154 Chief Justice Saufley emphasized that the Legislature did not intend that 
investigatory records were to be presumed accessible to the public under Maine's 
FOAA, as most other governmental records are. 155 
Therefore, according to the concurrence, the real issue in the case was whether 
Blethen had asserted a "credible allegation of governmental misconduct" on the part 
145. Id. ,r 31,871 A.2d at 533. 
146. Id. ,r 32,871 A.2d at 533-34. 
147. Id. ,r 35, 871 A.2d at 534. 
148. Id. ,r 36,871 A.2d at 534. 
149. Id. ,r 36, 871 A.2d at 534-35. 
150. Id. ,r 37, 871 A.2d at 535. 
15 I. Id. ,r 40, 871 A.2d at 535. 
152. Id. ,r 41,871 A.2d at 536 (Saufley, C.J., concurring). 
153. Id. ,r 45, 871 A.2d at 536. 
154. Id. ,r 42, 871 A.2d at 536. 
155. Id. ,r 43, 871 A.2d at 535. 
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of the Attorney General for not pursuing criminal prosecution of the alleged perpetra-
tors because under the Favish standard, the party urging disclosure must make a good 
faith allegation of governmental misconduct supported by evidence. 156 Although the 
concurrence acknowledged that Blethen had not specifically articulated such an 
allegation in its complaint and briefs, it concluded that "the serious allegations of child 
sexual abuse, involving many children, made or alleged to have occurred over decades, 
without prosecution, is equivalent to an allegation of governmental misconduct in the 
present case." 157 
In so finding, the concurrence explained that because of the unique factual 
circumstances of the case, such as the number of alleged victims and perpetrators and 
the fact that all the priests named in the reports were deceased, this case "pose[ d] 
special circumstances warranting greater flexibility in applying the FOAA analysis." 158 
Chief Justice Saufley therefore found application of the Exemption 7(C) balancing test 
appropriate in this case based on her view that Blethen had made a de facto assertion 
of governmental misconduct and because of the unique circumstances of the case. In 
working through this balancing test, the concurrence concluded that after redaction of 
all identifying information of witnesses and alleged victims, the public's interest in the 
records outweighed any remaining privacy interests. 159 The concurrence did 
emphasize, however, that the unique facts of the case meant that the court's holding 
had limited precedential force and would therefore not have a "chilling effect" on 
future prosecutorial investigations. 160 It therefore appears that Chief Justice Saufley 
believed Blethen had complied with theFavish evidentiaryrequirements implicitly, but 
not explicitly, most likely as a result of the timing of the decision in Favish. 161 
However, in the future, the concurrence would require faithful compliance with the 
Favish standards in order for a party to adequately assert a public interest cognizable 
under the FOAA. 162 
Justice Clifford's dissent,joined by Justices Rudman and Alexander, argued that 
both the majority and the concurrence had dramatically relaxed the standard for when 
public dissemination of criminal investigative records was warranted. 163 First, the 
dissenters emphasized that the language of the Criminal Record Act expressly exempts 
criminal investigative records from disclosure pursuant to the FOAA as long as there 
is a "reasonable possibility" that public release will "[c]onstitute an unwarranted 
invasion ofprivacy." 164 Under this statutory framework, the dissenters argued that the 
majority had erred in its assessment of what personal privacy interests still existed in 
the information contained in the reports. 165 Second, the dissenters found that the 
privacy interests of the witnesses and victims had not been greatly diminished or 
156. Id. ,r 41 n.13, 871 A.2d at 537 n. 13 (citing Nat'I Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 
157, 174 (2004)). 
151. Id. ,r47, 871 A.2d at 537. 
158. Id.,r47n.13,871 A.2dat537n.13. 
159. Id. ,r 48,871 A.2d at 537. 
160. Id. ,r 49,871 A.2d at 537. 
161. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
162. See id. ,r,r 45-46, 871 A.2d at 536-37. 
163. Id. ,r 52,871 A.2d at 538 (Clifford, J., dissenting). 
164. Id. ,r 53,871 A.2d at 538-39 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 614(l)(C) (2006)). 
165. Id. ,r,r 58-59, 871 A.2d at 540. 
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extinguished by the passage of time and the manner in which the incidents were 
reported. 166 Instead, because much of the information contained in the reports had not 
yet been publicly disclosed and most reports were made to the Diocese and not to 
prosecutors, thus diminishing the likelihood that the disclosures were made with the 
expectation of criminal prosecutions, the victims and witnesses whose statements 
appeared in the reports retained strong personal privacy interests in non-disclosure of 
this information. 167 Finally, the dissenters also found that the immediate family 
members of the deceased priests did have residual privacy interests that had been 
greatly reduced, but not completely extinguished, by the passage of time. 168 
Because of these significant privacy interests, the dissent argued that disclosure 
of the records was warranted only ifthere was a "significant public interest" in such 
disclosure; otherwise, there was no balancing of interests to be done by the court. 169 
The dissenters found that no such substantial public interest was present in this case. 170 
According to Justice Clifford's dissent, because the central purpose of the FOAA is to 
serve the public interest in determining governmental impropriety, "disclosure of 
private information that implicates no wrongdoing on the part of a governmental entity 
generates insufficient public interest and therefore falls well outside the scope and 
application of FOAA." 171 Therefore, the dissent felt that the Favish requirements 
should have been applied to this case; specifically, Blethen should have been required 
"to produce evidence 'that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that ... 
alleged Government impropriety might have occurred."' 172 The dissent also sought 
to make it clear that general public interest in a criminal investigation does not fall 
within the FOAA 's central purpose. 173 The dissent therefore concluded that because 
Blethen did not specifically allege any governmental wrongdoing and because general 
public curiosity does not meet the significant public interest standard warranting 
disclosure of private records, the Attorney General should have prevailed. 174 
Finally, the dissent found fault with the majority's decision to redact these names 
simply because "it [was] neither impractical nor onerous to do so" and because "the 
public interest [would] not be undermined by the redaction." 175 The dissent aired 
concerns that such a holding would have serious implications for future police 
investigations of crimes. 176 Specifically, the dissent feared that leaving the decision to 
redact the names of witnesses and victims to "the broad discretion of a trial court" to 
assess how impractical or onerous redaction would be, would have "the effect of 
deterring the reporting of criminal activity out of fear that, even if prosecution is not 
166. Id. ,I 58,871 A.2d at 540. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. ,I 59, 871 A.2d at 540. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. ,I 60, 871 A.2d at 540. 
171. Id. ,i 63, 871 A.2d at 541 (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the 
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 774 (1989)). 
172. See id. ,i 65,871 A.2d at 542 (quotingNat'I Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 
174 (2004)). 
173. Id. ,I 64,871 A.2d at 541. 
174. Id. ,i,I 66, 69, 871 A.2d at 542. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. ,I 67,871 A.2d at 542. 
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initiated, humiliating and embarrassing events in personal lives may be revealed years 
later." 177 Thus, the court's decision in this case to redact the names of victims and 
witnesses was not enough to ensure that the privacy interests of those making such 
reports in the future would be protected because the standard the majority set for 
redaction was overly subjective and vague. 
In a separate dissent, Justice Alexander emphasized his view that the court's 
holding would cause serious changes in practices regarding the confidentiality of 
criminal investigations.178 Specifically, Alexander's dissent urged that the court's 
holding implied that whenever a decision not to prosecute is made by the Attorney 
General, ''the 'public interest' may be invoked to justify turnover of investigative 
records to the press, and anyone else who asks." 179 This release would be made 
"regardless of the risk of harm or embarrassment to victims, to individuals who may 
have been wrongly or mistakenly accused, or to witnesses who have reported relevant 
information." 180 The dissent therefore concluded that Blethen's success would, in fact, 
work against the public interest and deter others from reporting crimes, especially 
those of sexual abuse, because the protections afforded by court-ordered redaction 
were "illusory" at best. 181 
V. AN UNEASY BALANCE 
None of the approaches utilized by the four opinions in Blethen strike an ideal 
balance between protecting the privacy interests of victims and alleged perpetrators of 
sexual abuse crimes and the public's right to know "what their government is up to." 
The majority reached the correct conclusion in this case and came closest to 
accomplishing this balance, yet its approach risks sending the message that the 
guarantees of privacy to those reporting sexual abuse crimes are illusory at best. 182 
First, the majority explained that in this case, because the victims voluntarily reported 
their complaints and were not under the protection of the confessional, they had a 
reasonable expectation that investigation, and thus disclosure of their identities, would 
ensue. 183 In light of this, the majority concluded that the victims' interests in continued 
privacy were reduced. 184 However, this conclusion failed to recognize that many 
victims, especially of domestic or sexual abuse, voluntarily report their allegations but 
do not wish for their identities and status as a victim to become an item of public 
knowledge. 185 The majority therefore discounts the fact that although a victim who 
177. Id. ,i,i 67-68, 871 A.2d at 542. 
178. Id. ,i 70,871 A.2d at 542 (Alexander, J., dissenting). 
179. Id. ,i 72, 871 A.2d at 543. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. W 73, 75, 871 A.2d at 543. 
182. See id. ,i 75, 871 A.2d at 543. 
183. Id. W 20-21, 871 A.2d at 530 (majority opinion). 
184. Id. 
185. For an explanation of why protecting the identities of victims of crimes of sexual assault is 
important, see Kimberly Kelley Blackburn, Identity Protection for Sexual Assault Victims: Exploring 
Alternatives to the Publication of Private Facts Tort, 55 S.C. L. REv. 619, 621-22 (2004). The author 
explains that policies in favor of protecting the identities of victims of sexual assault include the desire to 
protect victims from further humiliation, sparing victims from the prevalent stigma that they contributed 
to their attack, the idea that it is not a victims' responsibility to educate the public about the realities of 
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reports sexual abuse may know that his identity will be contained in government 
investigative files, he still maintains an interest in that information not being dis-
seminated by the government to the general public, especially through media dis-
closure. 186 In the case of crimes of sexual abuse, victims often have a greater fear of 
retaliation or public stigma. 187 The fear that such consequences will result may deter 
victims from coming forward to report crimes of sexual abuse. The majority, in not 
recognizing the substantiality of this privacy interest, failed to adequately protect the 
profound government interest in encouraging the prompt and open reporting of crimes 
and the need to protect victims and witnesses from harm for so doing. 
The failure of the majority to give sufficient weight to the profound privacy 
interests of victims of sexual abuse would not, however, be so troublesome had it also 
adopted a stronger standard for redaction that would more adequately protect victims 
and witnesses reporting sexual abuse. This it failed to do. The majority stated that 
although the victims and witnesses named in the investigative reports retained strong 
privacy interests, those interests could be significantly reduced by redacting all 
identifying information from the records sought. 188 The majority, however, qualified 
this statement by saying that redaction was appropriate here because it would be 
neither "impractical nor onerous. " 189 However, as both dissents asserted,190 such a 
subjective standard leaves victims and witnesses who report crimes with absolutely no 
assurance that their names will not soon become matters of public knowledge. Instead, 
the majority should have taken this opportunity in Blethen to establish a presumption 
in favor of redaction of the names of sexual assault victims, making redaction 
mandatory in all but the exceptional case. 191 
Both dissents adequately stated the dangers of such subjective and vague criteria 
for court-ordered redaction. First, the dissents asserted that the "impractical nor 
onerous" standard would have the effect of chilling reporting of crimes. 192 This risk 
sexual assault, physical protection of victims from retribution or further harm, increasing the reporting of 
crimes and the number of arrests, encouraging participation in court proceedings, and protecting the 
victim's sense of self. Id. For the opposing view, see Sarah Henderson Hutt, In Praise of Public Access: 
Why the Government Should Disclose the Identities of Alleged Crime Victims, 41 DUKE L.J. 368 ( 1991 ). 
The author argues that a historical analysis favors the public's right to access the identity of a victim of any 
crime, and that nondisclosure ofa victim's identity is not desirable because many victims do not wish to 
remain anonymous based on their desire to raise social awareness, that nondisclosure perpetuates the stigma 
of being a rape victim because of the special treatment afforded victims of this crime, and that maintaining 
the confidentiality of the victim but not of the accused is unfair to the accused's right to a fair trial and 
presumption of innocence. Id at 370, 397-99. 
186. SeP Blackbum, supra note 185, at 639 (advocating the enactment of legislation that prevents 
disclosure by the government ofa sexual assault victim's identity to the press). 
187. Blackbum, supra note 185, at 621-22. 
188. Blethen, 2005 ME 56, ,r 39,871 A.2d at 535. 
189. Id 
190. Id. ,r 67, 871 A.2d at 542 (Clifford, J., dissenting); ,r 75, 871 A.2d at 543 (Alexander, J., 
dissenting). 
191. For the view that legislatures should enact statutory measures, such as consistent use of pseudonyms 
in court room documents and proceedings and systematic redaction of names from police and court 
documents, in order to protect sexual assault victims' identity, see Blackbum, supra note 185, at 637-38. 
192. Blethen, 2005 ME 56, ,r 64, 871 A.2d at 541 (Clifford, J., dissenting); ,r 73, 871 A.2d at 543 
(Alexander, J., dissenting). 
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of quelling the reporting and investigation of crimes as heinous as sexual abuse should 
not be taken lightly. Also, in arguing that this redaction standard would fail to 
adequately protect the privacy interests of all those named in investigative records, 193 
the dissenters recognized the true value at stake in cases addressing the personal 
privacy exemption of the FOAA in relation to victims of sexual abuse: the power to 
disclose information should lie with the victim; thus, only those victims who have 
voluntarily reported their allegations to the public should have a reduced or extin-
guished privacy interest in nondisclosure of investigative records concerning such 
allegations. 194 Therefore, the dissent was correct in arguing that personal information 
appearing in investigative records should be redacted as a matter of course prior to 
disclosure, no matter how impractical or onerous. 
However, the majority did establish a commendable and novel standard for 
evaluating what public interests fall within the FOAA' s central purpose and thus weigh 
in favor of disclosure. 195 The majority found no reason to graft the requirements 
established in Favish, regarding the need for the requestor to produce evidence of 
governmental misconduct, onto Maine's FOAA. 196 The majority declared that the 
central purpose of the FOAA encompassed more than the public's right to learn of 
governmental misconduct; instead, it included the right of the public to know about 
governmental activity in general, good or bad, especially when that activity was one 
of significant interest to an informed citizenry. 197 Thus, the majority sets a lower bar 
than federal law in defining the standard requestors must meet to establish a substantial 
public interest in disclosure of records. The majority implicitly recognized that 
citizens may have a legitimate interest in all the workings of their government, not just 
those that are corrupt or questionable. Although the majority does not intimate 
whether evidence of such government activity must appear in the complaint, or whether 
such a standard would permit claims for information based on a derivative use 
argument, the majority did take an important step in strengthening the public's right 
to be informed about the workings of its government. 
The concurrence criticized the majority's rejection of the requirements of Favish, 
stating that "in the absence of an allegation of governmental wrongdoing, the interests 
in protection of the witnesses, alleged victims, informants, and others who have been 
the subject of investigation would outweigh the public's interest in disclosure." 198 
Although the concurrence concluded that Blethen 's complaint contained the equivalent 
of such an allegation of government misconduct, 199 this standard is unduly restrictive 
of the public's right to be informed about the actions of the government in other, less 
sensational instances. 
Both dissents also strongly questioned the wisdom of expanding the concept of 
public interest under the FOAA, as the majority arguably did in finding the Favish 
193. Id. ,i 67, 871 A.2d at 542 (Clifford, J., dissenting); ,i 75, 871 A.2d at 543 (Alexander, J., 
dissenting). 
194. See id. ,i 56, 871 A.2d at 539. 
195. Id. ,i 32, 871 A.2d at 533 (majority opinion). 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. ,i 46,871 A.2d at 536-37 (Saufley, C.J., concurring). 
199. Id. ,i 47, 871 A.2d at 537. 
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principles inapplicable. 200 However, their approaches misinterpreted the majority's 
analysis. The majority did not assert that when ''the subject [ of an investigation] has 
become the focus of public attention or concern" dis!=losure of investigative records 
would be automatically compelled. 201 The diss~nts' fears that the majority's interpreta-
tion of public interest would render the personal privacy exemption ineffective was 
misplaced because the dissents failed to recognize that the requestors must still be 
seeking information about government activity, and not just matters of"general public 
interest. "202 Further, the dissenters failed to consider that the majority's only mistake 
might have been its failure to craft a stronger redaction standard, and not its expansion 
of the concept of public interest under the FOAA. In other words, ihe dissent did not 
acknowledge that a more protective redaction standard could serve as a valuable 
counter-weight to the expanded concept of public interest found by the majority when 
the court is called upon to balance the public and private interests at stake under the 
personal privacy exemption to the FOAA. 
Although all four opinions asserted divergent and conflicting views, together they 
illustrate that in Maine and Federal courts alike, the balancing act that must be done 
under freedom of information Jaws is a high-wire one. The task of weighing the 
public's right to be informed against the general citizen's right to privacy is a crucial 
one and defines the very nature of qemocracy. The complexity of this issue is clear 
from numerous opinions issued by the court in Blethen, and will undoubtedly continue 
to be so in the near future as similar cases enter the courthouse. 
200. Id. 'II 64, 871 A.2d at 541 (Clifford, J., dissenting); 'If 72, 871 A.2d at 543 (Alexander, J., 
dissenting). 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 'II 64,871 A.2d at 541 (Clifford, J., dissenting). 
